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ABSTRACT 
Following Mises’s foundational paper, first published in 1920 (Mises 1935), writers in the 
Austrian tradition have argued that socialism is impossible, because under socialism there 
would be no private property in the means of production, and without that private property 
economic calculation could not take place.  In the paper ‘Economic Calculation: Private 
Property or Several Control?’, published in this journal (Denis 2015), I argued that that this 
was mistaken.  Not private property, but several control, was required for economic 
calculation, and since several control is consistent with public ownership, this argument for 
the impossibility of socialism fails.  Bylund and Manish (2017), published in this issue of the 
Review of Political Economy, defends the traditional interpretation of Austrian reasoning, 
contending that my argument fails.  This Rejoinder re-states the issues, addressing, and, 
ultimately rejecting, the Bylund and Manish critique.   
 
ARTICLE HISTORY 
Received 15 July 2017 
Accepted  
 
KEY WORDS 
Austrian economics; economic calculation; ownership and control; 
private property; several property; socialist calculation debate 
 
JEL CODES 
B13; B14; B41; B53 
 
 
 
                                                             
 CONTACT Andy Denis a.m.p.denis@city.ac.uk 
1 Introduction 
 
In 1920, shortly after the establishment of the Soviet Union, Mises initiated the economic 
calculation debate (or the socialist calculation debate) with his paper ‘Economic Calculation 
in the Socialist Commonwealth’ (Mises 1935).  In this and subsequent publications, Mises 
and writers in the Austrian tradition have argued that socialism was impossible, because 
without private property there would be no scope for economic calculation.  Subsequent 
contributions from socialist and neoclassical quarters argued for a form of market socialism, 
in which households would interact with firms in product and labour markets, but the firms 
would be state-owned.  In the Austrian view, this did not answer the question, as state-
ownership of firms would still prevent economic calculation regarding the allocation of 
capital.  Section Two of this Rejoinder sets out the argument for the necessity of economic 
calculation, and its dependence on private property.   
In a recent issue of this journal, I argued (Denis 2015) that the Austrian economists 
had misunderstood their own analysis.  Rather than private property, I argued, the Austrian 
analysis only required several property for economic calculation to function.  The term 
several property is a term introduced into the literature by Friedrich Hayek, and is somewhat 
looser than private property, consistent with both private property and collective ownership.  
Moreover, I argued, for Austrian thought the key issue is not ownership, but control: not who 
the ultimate beneficiary of an action is, but who carries it out, and in what circumstances.  
Hence, combining both points, the Austrian requirement for economic calculation was, not 
private property, but several control—which is not inconsistent with public ownership.  The 
Austrians had thus been incorrect to assume that their analysis pointed to an incompatibility 
between economic calculation and the collective ownership of the means of production.  
Section Three of this Rejoinder re-states the argument for this conclusion.   
It is indeed gratifying for a scholar to have her/his work noticed and subjected to 
criticism.  I am therefore extremely grateful to Per Bylund and G.P. Manish, who have 
written a reply to my 2015 paper, entitled ‘Private Property and Economic Calculation: A 
Reply to Andy Denis’ (Bylund and Manish 2017).  I am also very grateful to the editors of 
the Review of Political Economy, both for publishing Bylund and Manish’s paper and for 
offering me the opportunity to write a Rejoinder.  Bylund and Manish (henceforth B&M) 
argue that a scheme for public ownership with several control (henceforth POSC) cannot 
work, and therefore that the argument of Denis (2015) fails.  Their argument is that under 
current conditions the allocation of capital is guided by the prospect of a possible loss of that 
capital, whereas under POSC this prospect would be absent.  This makes it impossible to tie 
the interests of managers to those of the owners of the capital.  Under capitalism, this is 
mitigated by the activism of the owners of capital in choosing how to allocate capital and the 
limits to impose on the activity of the managers.  Under POSC, however, this would be 
impossible.  Either the state would intervene, just as capitalists do today, to protect its capital, 
or it would not.  If not, then its capital would be eroded by the bad decisions and corruption 
of the managers.  But if it does so intervene, then it would have to do so according to a plan, 
and they could not have such a plan for all the reasons set out by Mises and subsequent 
Austrian writers.  Section Four of this paper sets out in detail the Bylund and Manish critique.   
Section Five gives my response to these claims.  There is no obvious reason to believe 
that there would be any difference, between capitalism and POSC, in the capacity of the 
owners of capital to align agents’ actions with the interests of the principals, of such 
magnitude as to render POSC impossible.  Equally, there is no reason to assume that under 
POSC the owner of capital, the community as a whole, would be any less vigilant and 
diligent in selecting and then monitoring the personnel to run their businesses, and 
constraining the spheres of their activity, than the owners of capital are today.   
A final section draws the conclusion that the B&M account is unpersuasive, and that 
the propositions of Denis (2015) withstand their critique.   
 
2 Economic calculation and private property  
 
When an agent makes a market transaction, they receive information from the market and 
transmit information to the market.  The agent makes a judgement of the utility they believe 
they may obtain from consuming a unit of the merchandise.  They also make a judgement on 
the utility they may expect from using the funds required for the purchase of one unit, its 
price, not for purchasing this good, but the next best alternative good.  The relative price of 
the good plays a key role in this decision.  The higher the price, the more of the alternative is 
foregone, and so the greater the utility foregone.  Diminishing returns implies that additional 
units will yield smaller additions to satisfaction.  The rational agent should buy further units 
until the last unit is expected to yield as much utility as the foregone alternative.  This is 
economic calculation.  It is a calculation of costs and benefits of this transaction on the basis 
of the market price of the good and the set of preferences held by the purchaser.  The 
purchaser’s decision on where to stop, on how many units to consume, transmits to the 
market the demand for the good.  A similar story can be told for supply.  The market 
aggregates over all the market’s participants, the price of the good impounding the 
information received from all the buyers and sellers.  Without economic calculation, too 
many or too few units of every good would be produced—prices would give no guidance to 
market participants on the costs and benefits to others of the decisions that they take.   
Let us apply this to the market for capital goods.  The entrepreneur, in deciding 
whether to purchase an investment, does not compare the utility s/he expects to obtain with 
the price, and hence the utility of the foregone commodity.  Rather s/he must speculate on the 
utility that the consumers of the products produced by means of this investment will obtain, 
expressed in the price they will be willing to pay.  If s/he expects the present value of the 
increased future revenue s/he can expect from the employment of this capital good to exceed 
the price s/he must pay for it, then it is profitable: s/he should purchase additional units until 
the expected increment in profit falls to zero.  In this way, the total social capital will be 
allocated to those activities judged to be most profitable, that is, precisely those activities 
where the consumers are judged to be willing to express their preference for the product with 
the greatest demand.  This is not to say that this efficient allocation is ever attained, or that 
the decision just described will necessarily be correct; rather, an efficient allocation is 
continually approached, as errors made by one agent open opportunities for profitable activity 
to others (Boettke 2001, p. 32).  Without economic calculation, this error discovery and 
correction mechanism would not be possible, and capital would be allocated wastefully.   
This story is probably common to the majority of economists.  The Austrian view of 
the necessity of private property can now be delineated.  According to Boettke (2001, p. 33), 
there are four elements to the Austrian argument against socialism, of which two directly 
pertain to private property:  
1. Private property in the funds used for the purchase of a commodity, and then the 
commodity itself, are required to generate the correct incentives for careful 
husbandry, for making the best judgement on costs and benefits that can be attained in 
the circumstances.  If the funds employed do not represent a sacrifice to the agent, 
why should they care whether the transaction is a sensible use of those funds? 
2. In a dynamic market setting, entrepreneurs have to make the best possible choices 
regarding capital allocation to engage with an unknown future.  In order for the 
entrepreneurs to have the incentive to do this to the best of their abilities, they have to 
be driven by ‘the lure of pure profit and the penalty of loss’ (ibid).   
So, for Austrian thought, private property is required for incentives to play their role, guiding 
the activity of agents into socially desirable channels.  Without private property, 
entrepreneurs do not face the consequences of their own errors, the prospect of the loss of 
their capital.   
 
3 From private property to several control 
 
Denis (2015) makes the case that, what the Austrian account requires, for successful 
economic calculation, is, not private, but several property.  Several property, or property in 
severalty, is property which is owned by a single person or legal entity, ‘severed’ from other 
owners.  It is the opposite and complement of common ownership.  Several property includes 
private property, and state-ownership.  It is the term which has been preferred by some 
writers in the Austrian tradition, notably Friedrich Hayek (1988; see also Barnett [1998] 
2014).  Reviewing a subset of Austrian works dealing specifically with the question of 
economic calculation, Denis (2015) found that wherever they spoke of ‘private property’, 
what they actually described was several property.  Hence this particular argument for the 
impossibility of socialism failed: they had made the case for the necessity of several property 
to permit economic calculation, but several property includes state-ownership.   
Further, some Austrian writers had insightfully stressed that what was key for 
economic calculation was, not ownership, but control, of resources.  As Hayek (1988, p. 86) 
put it, ‘decentralised control over resources, control through several property, leads to the 
generation and use of more information than is possible under central direction’.  Randy 
Barnett ([1998] 2014, p. 68) adds ‘The right of several property suggests that the control of 
resources should reflect the dispersal of personal and local knowledge’.  Boettke (2001, p. 
177), expresses the same idea when asserting that  
In economics, ownership rights refer to the locus of effective decision-making about the 
use of resources (i.e. de facto ownership), and may or may not be consistent with legal 
boundaries of property (de jure ownership). This insight is today a standard convention 
among economists.   
Don Lavoie (1981, p. 42) even claimed that a major difference separating the neoclassical 
from the Austrian approach was that in the neoclassical account ‘ownership’ was ‘taken to 
mean formal legal title, rather than de facto control, over resources’.  The implication of these 
comments seems to be that, for economic calculation to work, what is required is not a 
particular form of property in capital, but that the capital be locally or severally controlled.  
Putting the two together implies that Austrian analysis is consistent with state ownership of 
the means of production combined with local control by teams of managers acting on behalf 
of the community as a whole.  The management of the firm constitutes the locus of effective 
decision-making about the use of resources, managers exert decentralised, local, de facto 
control over capital assets, using and generating knowledge specific to time and place.   
The question immediately arises as to how incentives are to be tailored to bind their 
interests to those of the community as a whole.  But this is a question which capitalism faces 
too.  Under current conditions, the bulk of decision-making regarding the allocation and use 
of capital is carried out, not by capitalists, owners of capital, but by managers, the controllers 
of enterprises—by agents, that is, and not by principals.  Any argument that this would not be 
possible under socialism therefore has to establish a difference, between capitalism and 
socialism, in the employment of agents on behalf of principals, such that socialism would be 
impossible—not just a difference, but a difference which makes a difference.   
 
4 Bylund and Manish: not several control but private property?   
 
It is not easy to identify a clear critique of Denis (2015) in B&M’s article.  There are a 
number of statements of what Denis (2015) says which are simply empirically incorrect.  
There is rather more material, more than half their article, with much of which I would 
agree—but in context it reads as if it were a criticism of something that I have said.  It would 
be tedious to rehearse these points here.  Rather I have done my best to pick out a thread 
which expresses their attempt to defeat the argument of Denis (2015).   
The core and backbone of the B&M argument is that capitalists not only strive for 
profit, but seek to avoid loss: there are more than 30 references to this point throughout their 
article.  They claim that it marks a fundamental point of departure from the Denis analysis, 
and that I, by ignoring this point, implicitly ignore uncertainty, assuming that investments 
will always yield a profit: ‘economic calculation indeed requires private property, and not 
simply several control, because entrepreneurship under competitive discovery must be 
subject to both the lure of profit and the risk of loss’ (p. 2).  Denis, they say, ‘implicitly 
assumes away the possibility of suffering a monetary loss and the possibility of failure’ (p. 
13). 
The significance for B&M of the possibility of making a negative profit, is that it 
creates a fundamental obstacle to linking the interests of managers and equity-holders in an 
enterprise.  One might have supposed that 4 per cent is better than 2 per cent, 2 per cent better 
than 0 per cent, and 0 per cent better than minus 2 per cent.  But for B&M there is a profound 
qualitative change as we pass from positive to negative returns.  While it is possible to devise 
contracts such that employees may share in the success of an enterprise, and receive a share 
of the profits, this is not the case for losses: ‘given the fact that it is the capitalist that owns 
the funds being deployed, he (or she) is the one that ultimately suffers the losses that result 
from the decisions of the agent’ (p. 14). ‘The agent … acts on the principal’s behalf, but does 
not bear the losses of decisions that don’t pan out’ (p. 17).  
B&M insist the proposition that agents cannot participate in the losses of failed 
investments is independent of the form of contract by which the agent is employed:  
It is vital to note that this holds true regardless of the nature of the contract between the 
capitalist and the agent … regardless of how the terms of this contract [the agent’s 
contract of employment] may vary, it is nevertheless the case that the latter [the agent] 
cannot bear any losses suffered owing simply to the fact that he is not the owner of the 
resources being invested. Losses are suffered by the capitalist owner. (p. 21) 
Given this obstacle that capitalists face, in aligning the interests of managers with their own 
interest in preserving their capital, the capitalists are forced into activity: ‘That the capitalist 
does not simply pocket the profits but is also on the hook for potential losses has an important 
economic implication: he cannot be a passive spectator … the perennial specter of a loss 
impels the capitalist to engage in active decision making’ (p.15).  The capitalist must carry 
out economic calculation, and intervene, at the very least to determine ‘who his agent should 
be, [and] how much capital he should bestow on him, and when’ (p.15).  
But, for B&M, the consequences will be very different under capitalism and under 
POSC.  Under capitalism this activism is manifest in  
the speculative activities of the capital owners on the capital and financial markets. 
Indeed, it is the decisions made by the capitalists in these markets that determine the size 
of the endowment of funds that the manager can allocate on the various factor markets 
(pp. 19-20).   
But this will be impossible under socialism as, even if some financial markets remain, the 
market for corporate equity will not, since all equity is owned by the state.  The consequence 
is that the managers, sharing in the profit of the corporation, but not its losses, will be less 
risk-averse: 
the manager of a public sector firm in a decentralized socialist economy and the private 
capitalist in a market economy will come to significantly different conclusions regarding 
the viability and the potential profitability of the same production projects. The 
appraisements and judgments of the former, which will not be tempered by the prospect 
of suffering a loss on account of the fact that he will not be allocating his own capital, 
will tend to be more optimistic and less cautious than those of the latter, whose 
judgments will necessarily be influenced by the prospect of losing the capital on hand. 
(pp. 27-28) 
Hence the socialist state will be forced into a dilemma.  Its presumed lack of activism in 
constraining the managers of firms will lead to ‘an unsustainable production structure that 
will bear little relation to consumer preferences’ (p. 28), and ‘if the state decides to rectify the 
situation, the only trick up its sleeve will be the imposition of a central plan’ (p. 28).  Such a 
central plan would have ‘the result that the complicated production structure inherited from 
the capitalist economy of the past will ultimately unravel into one that is much more 
rudimentary in nature’ (p. 25).  
Thus B&M argue that POSC is not a possibility.   
 
5 Evaluation of the Bylund and Manish argument 
 
The argument of B&M is not compelling.  To take the point on which everything else 
depends, is there really a qualitative difference between positive and negative profits which 
makes a difference here—and a difference such that POSC would not be possible?  Is it really 
the case, that it is possible to reward managers for success, but not to penalise them for 
failure?  It is far from obvious that this is so, and B&M do not attempt to argue the case in 
their article.  Moreover it is evident from the behaviour of firms today that strenuous efforts 
are made to reward managers for success and penalise them for failure.  It is difficult to see 
why that should necessarily be any different under state ownership.   
Is it the case that, given a managerial interest in excessive risk-taking, there is no way 
that the authorities in a POSC arrangement could combat this?  Corporations today invest 
considerable resources in the selection of appropriate staff, in the observation of their 
performance and the removal of those judged inadequate, and in the construction of contracts 
which bind their interests to those of the owners of the enterprise.  Regulators, moreover, may 
take steps if they judge that managerial behaviour is inadequately aligned with the interests of 
stakeholders.   
The IMF (International Monetary Fund 2014, p. 106-7) reminds us that in the 
traditional analysis of the tension between agent and principal, managers were viewed as 
unduly risk-averse.  It was thought that they might be unwilling to risk their personal wealth 
and human capital that might be firm-specific.  So the worry was that agents were 
disproportionally harmed by losses to the principals: the opposite of B&M’s concern.  The 
IMF is specifically concerned with financial institutions and in very recent decades; there the 
problem has been excessive risk-taking by managers, imposing risks as an externality on 
equity-owners, on creditors, and on the public.  The IMF develops a number of means for 
mitigating such behaviour.  At the top of the list is monitoring by ‘large shareholders’.   
The significance of this is that many small shareholders face a prisoner’s dilemma: 
each will benefit to a small extent from their own effort in monitoring and exerting control 
over the directors and management.  This externality is partially internalised when the 
shareholder is large.  It is completely internalised when there is one shareholder, as is the case 
in POSC.  To reduce the cost of monitoring, compensation packages can be set up to link the 
interest of the manager more closely to that of other stakeholders.  This can be adapted to 
strengthen the manager’s interest in the firm not making losses, if that is thought pressing: 
that can be done by making a smaller part of the compensation package fixed, and making the 
variable component, the bonus, subject to deferral and clawbacks (IMF 2014, p. 108).  Other 
methods include the appointment of independent board members and an independent risk 
committee.  It would be unreasonable to assume that such methods would be unavailable 
under POSC.  They will never be perfect, but, equally, they cannot be assumed to be so 
deficient under POSC as to make the latter impossible.   
B&M place a lot of weight on the activism of the capitalist today, and the assumed 
passivity of the state under POSC.  Both are exaggerated.  The overwhelming bulk of the 
decisions that B&M ascribe to capitalists are today undertaken by agents on behalf of 
capitalists.  The trading of assets on financial markets is generally undertaken by employees 
of large firms—banks, pension funds, mutuals, insurance companies, and so on.  The 
decisions regarding the launch of new enterprises, and extensions of existing ones, is likewise 
largely in the hands of employees, or firms hired specifically for the purpose.   
Regardless of whether new capital is sought by issuing equity or bonds, or by 
requesting new bank loans, the decisions are made by an army of administrators, lawyers, 
accountants, and so on.  B&M have given no reason to suppose that it would be any different 
under POSC.  Rather, we should expect that the ministers and administrators (held to account 
by the media), the board members (including non-executive directors, and representatives of 
stakeholders, such as creditors and worker representatives), the lawyers and accountants, the 
civil servants and bankers, will wish to ensure the success of the enterprises under their 
influence and will exert themselves to that end much as they do today.  B&M have not 
proposed any reason to assume that they would be less diligent, and less vigilant, than their 
counterparts today, and even less reason to assume that, if they were, they would be less 
vigilant and diligent to the extent that POSC would be impossible.   
 
5 Conclusion 
 
This Rejoinder has drawn the conclusion that the critique of Denis (2015) presented by 
Bylund and Manish fails to hit its target.  It has long been recognised that there is a difficulty 
aligning the interests of agents with those of principals.  It is difficult to see that there would 
necessarily be a greater difficulty of this kind under POSC than under today’s capitalism, of 
sufficient magnitude to render POSC impossible.  The argument that under capitalism the 
actions of agents are constrained by the prospect of loss of that capital, while under POSC 
they would not be so constrained, appears to be without force.  It would be unreasonable to 
assume that the owners of capital under POSC, the community as a whole, and its 
representatives, would necessarily exercise less diligence and vigilance in defence of their 
property than the owners of capital do today.  That B&M’s argument has not successfully 
challenged the propositions of Denis (2015) does not mean that those propositions will not 
face successful challenge in the future.  It is indeed to be hoped that Austrian scholars will 
engage in this discussion and undertake further work on this topic.   
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